ABSTRACT Despite being a rather recalcitrant tool, the 'Pap smear' is today the major cancer screening technology in the world. This paper examines how and why heterogeneous actors chose to advocate the Pap smear as a screen for cervical cancer in the late 1940s, and to tinker both in and far beyond the diagnostic laboratory for over 50 years to make the Pap smear 'fit' as a screening and clinical technology. Tinkerings included gendering the division of labour, attempting to automate reading of smears, juggling costs, exploring alternative screening technologies, pushing for regulation of laboratories, and settling for locally-negotiated orders of clinical accuracy instead of global standardization, still elusive today. 
interventions by feminist women's health activists, and to counter the recolonization of the women's health movement by mainstream medicine. 18 Our account is organized as follows. We first address the issue of why the Pap smear initially became a screening technology through a brief analysis of its historical development. Even though it eventually became the 'right' tool, the Pap smear was never a 'wrong' tool historically, as it never actually became a tool until embedded in practice with a clearly stated use. But we examine some reasons why it did not become the right tool sooner, and also why it may be considered ineffective or problematic (that is, 'wrong') by some actors in terms of the criteria listed above. We next elaborate each of the major 'tinkering' strategies used to transform the Pap smear into the 'right' tool for the job of cancer prevention and early therapeutic intervention. Theoretically, we play off the commonsense assumption that technologies work relatively well and relatively easily, or else they would not be in widespread use. The Pap smear is one technology which refutes this assumption rather vividly. By detailing the multiple ways in which this technology has been massaged and manipulated to transform it into a reasonably 'right' tool, we reveal how the history of the Pap smear, like the history of most biomedical tools, is a history of compromise and making do.'9 The Pap smear seems to be at an extreme end of a continuum of 'making do'. Although it is widely viewed as the best available tool, it is far from an ideal screening technology, and efforts to replace the Pap smear with alternative diagnostic procedures have, since its inception, been constantly pursued -for over half a century! Why the Pap Smear Became the 'Right' Tool for the Job Twentieth-century biological research on the cellular, molecular and genetic 'hows' of cancer is well known.20 Less known are efforts to define the 'what, when and where' of cancer, of special concern to clinicians but also involving a wide array of biomedical researchers and other interested actors. Increasingly across the century, cancer has been handled both clinically and in terms of research by its bodily location -actually a 'crosscutting' classification system. For example, lungs, breasts, the colorectum, the skin, and the cervix and uterus have each been sites of focus. The cervix has been especially intriguing for research due to two of its properties. First, the cervix is accessible without medically invasive (surgical) procedures;21 and second, through routine obstetrical and gynecological practices, there is considerable ease of access to the research materialswomen. 22 ... together they outlined a program whereby 'the first step would be the development and establishment of its validity; the second phase would be to train others to use it; and finally an effort would be made to educate the medical profession and the public concerning what the method had to In short, while the clinical gaze had long focused on the cervix for many reasons, including cancer, Papanicolaou's work essentially provided a new high-magnification lens. This lens promised the possibility of diagnosing very early malignancies, early enough that readily available surgical and radiotherapy treatments of the day might, in fact, eliminate the cancer. That is, while clinical medicine did have 'magic bullets' (surgery with or without radiation), advanced invasive carcinoma was too large a target. But for early localized cervical and uterine carcinomas, there could be a 'goodness of fit' between medicine's extant magic bullets and the target. Thus one immediate value of the Pap smear screening technology was its enhancement of other extant downstream medical technologies including, as we shall see, the doctor's office itself.
However, the horror at exfoliated cells exhibited by pathologists at the 1928 meetings was not anomalous. The use of cytology in cancer detection before invasion occurred was seriously resisted by most pathologists. Even if the smear technique was capable of such detection, it was believed that pathologists would not have time to review the large number of slides necessary to find a positive case.41 That is, it was assumed that the emergent specialty of cytology (the study of exfoliated cells) would be absorbed within those departments of pathology where work centred around the study of cells in situ -specifically located and usually already 'suspicious' tissue samples surgically removed for biopsy. Cytological analyses, then, would be done in clinical laboratories along with a host of other diagnostic testing. At this time such laboratories were usually associated with hospitals and large out-patient facilities. Demand for all kinds of testing had expanded dramatically across the century, in both bacteriological and pathological analyses.42 Adding cytological analyses to extant facilities seemed particularly overwhelming in that most slides (about 75%) were expected to be 'normal'. 43 But in 1945, a tremendous boost was given to the Pap smear by the newly renamed and profoundly reorganized American Cancer Society (ACS). The original American Society for the Control of Cancer, begun in 1913, 'had been founded by several gynecologists and public-spirited laymen who wanted to impress women with the danger signs of uterine cancer, in an effort to treat cancer before it became advanced'.44 By 1943, their activities included a 'Women's Field Army' of 350,000 volunteers, who focused on patient education and awareness. 45 The new ACS emerged from 1944-46, when a group of business people oriented to fund-raising and research eased out the old guard. This occurred at the same time as the National Cancer Institute (NCI) was being revitalized by the US Public Health Service, and the National Institutes of Health were shifting from 'a nice quiet place out here in the country' to major biomedical research shops.46 In 1943, the ACS had an annual budget of $102,000; by 1945, it was over $4m and rising.47 The focus of the new ACS was on finding a cure for cancer (a 'downstream' approach) rather than cancer prevention (an 'upstream' approach). In terms of direct action, the ACS slogan was 'Every Doctor's Office a Cancer Detection Center'.48 The Pap smear appealed to ACS leaders as a simple technique that could help fulfil their slogan without the need for elaborate or expensive new technologies -the right tool for the chosen job.
Fully 25% of the new ACS funds were destined for research, with Dr Charles Cameron serving as medical and scientific director. Cameron promptly became a major advocate of the Pap smear as a core focus for ACS research, cancer prevention and early intervention.49 Via Cameron's advocacy, the ACS sponsored the First National Cytology Conference in Boston in 1948, a turning point in the wider acceptance of the Pap smear as a cancer screening procedure. Because the ACS was supporting the smear, pathologists and others, hoping to share in the newfound largesse of the ACS and its close ally the NCI, also began to support it.50
Training in reading slides, promotion of the smear as a screening technology, and major disease incidence discovery studies were the next foci, followed by more and bigger conferences. The basic characteristic of a screening procedure is that it is used in groups of presumably healthy persons to identify those individuals who are in need of further diagnostic attention. It may be applied to members of a community or to selected individuals where, for special reasons, there is an increased risk of disease.... To be useful as a public health or clinical measure, a screening procedure must meet certain criteria:
(1) The procedure must be relatively simple both at the clinical and at the laboratory level. Its performance must require a minimum of time and effort on the part of the doctor or technician, and it must be simple enough to be acceptable to the asymptomatic patient. At the laboratory or reading end, it must not be costly or present great technical difficulties.
(2) The yield of findings must be commensurate with the effort expended. Comparing the classificatory systems in Figure 1 , the first major point to note is the way in which classification processes have expanded over time to embrace non-invasive conditions (which might be benign or precancerous, but are usually indeterminate). Second, if we examine the chart carefully, we see that across time there were three, four, five, seven, six, and then again five classes or categories. Thus a pattern of increasing complexification was followed by one of simplification. This occurred over a period when the Pap smear was more and more widely used as a screening tool, increasingly institutionalized, and increasingly assessed for its adequacy and cost-effectiveness as an indicator for active prevention or early intervention.69 Most laboratories now report using more than one of these systems, a practice which generates its own set of constraints and confusion.70 Rather than representing global standardization (a stated goal in this arena), the existence of divergent classification systems illustrated in Figure 1 shows instead some of the heterogeneity requiring local 'workarounds' and 'tinkering' at many levels.
Slowness and Ambiguity in Reading and Processing Slides
The third area of chronic ambiguity, which can certainly slow down the pace, is reading and processing the slides.7' As one of the major actors in the field recently noted: This quotation is interesting not only for its discussion of the challenges of cytology, but for its representation of cells as active participants, stubbornly refusing to give up their secrets to the cytotechnician -or even the pathologist.
In sum, then, it seems clear that the Pap smear does not fulfil the criteria of a good screening procedure: it is not always fast, accurate or cheap. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the Pap smear is the 'wrong' tool for the job of cervical cancer screening. For some actors, the Pap smear qua technology did not meet particular clinical and/or research needs, and thus never became a tool at all. For other actors, however, the meaning of the Pap smear shifted from technology developed in one context to a useful tool in other contexts. However, addressing the Pap smear's shortcomings in terms of the criteria listed above, and then transforming it into a workable tool, required more than simply attributing a different meaning to this technology. In order to work as the right tool for the job of cervical cancer screening, the Pap smear had to become embedded in work arrangements, and in the technological arena in which it was used. In short, it had to be made into a tool that would work well enough for the purposes at hand.
Making (and Remaking) the Pap Smear Into the 'Right' Tool for the Job
Over the past half century, several sets of concrete practices have been used to achieve 'rightness of fit' between the Pap smear 'tool' and the 'job' of cancer screening. While these practices certainly have been deliberate strategies of cytologists, pathologists and other actors, they may also be seen as contingent developments related to the Pap smear's entrenchment locally. That is, some of these practices had very local origins and then spread; while others were essentially national from their inception. Further, not all practices recur at all sites. These practices have included, within the cancer arena, gendering the division of labour, automating the division of labour, cost juggling, abandoning global claims of classificatory accuracy for local negotiated orders, and promotion of alternatives to the Pap smear. From outside the cancer arena, particularly from women's health groups, have come pressures to rate and regulate laboratories.
Gendering the Division of Labour in Cytological Screening
Gendering the division of labour -using lower-paid women workers wherever possible -has been a major strategy for making the Pap smear into the right tool. This can be viewed as the feminization of the often hidden occupation of technician, 76 
Juggling Costs
The third set of practices we discuss is cost juggling, or laboratories simply charging more for other tests to keep the charges they make for Pap smear readings down. This strategy has been a hidden phenomenon, little discussed in the literature. Laboratories that process Pap smears also typically undertake many other tests in laboratory medicine, including pathological and histological tests. As an earlier quotation noted, there has been considerable success in automating tests based on clinical chemistry. This has occurred in a typical pattern of development: the means of automation were developed; prototypes and early models were very costly; as kinks were worked out and mass production and means of systematic integration developed, costs decreased rapidly. Laboratories had initially charged very high prices for these new tests, reflecting their actual cost. However, rather than decrease charges proportionally as costs decreased, laboratories have had the alternative of keeping costs for certain tests high when they cannot charge 'real time and money' costs for another test, due to competition, tradition and/or profit margin goals.
In interviews with people in laboratory medicine, this strategy of cost juggling was described as fundamental to keeping the cost of Pap smears down, making it appear to fulfil the criterion of 'cheap' within the 'fast, cheap and accurate' troika of criteria for mass screening procedures. This mechanism works especially well in conjunction with a gendered division of labour, and the concomitant development of smear reading as a homebased cottage industry with payment on a piece-work basis, both of which reduce costs. However, it is these practices which have also been linked to high rates of false negatives for Pap smears, as high as 15-40% or more,110 due in part to haste in reading slides.
Abandoning Global Accuracy for Locally Negotiated Orders
Another major strategy for making the Pap smear the right tool for the job of cancer screening has been the abandonment of hopes for global accuracy or accord about classification of Pap smears, in favour of local working arrangements between clinicians and pathologists in the actual laboratories where their work is done. Once controlled clinical trials were applied to Pap smear screening practices, many studies documented the lack of accord across laboratories, cytologists and cytotechnicians in the placement of smears along classification systems. While the ends of the continuum tend to be clear, classifying in the middle is notoriously varied and contested. The search for means of standardization has been long, arduous and not particularly successful."' Yet, in contrast, it has been recognized informally for some time that local arrangements between particular clinicians and laboratories can achieve a much higher degree of smear-reading accord, through regular communication about particular smears and about patient outcomes (biopsies, surgeries, and the like) over time. We are calling these locally negotiated orders to emphasize the on-going nature of the interactions, and hence the ever-present possibility of change.12 While never demonstrating 100% classificatory accord, such local negotiations or work-arounds seem to generate better than average results, especially in clinical outcomes. In fact, these informally recognized locally negotiated orders have recently become one premise for a new classification system, the Bethesda system."3 Even those who oppose the Bethesda system on other grounds laud such locally negotiated orders: 'The Bethesda group also appropriately emphasized the importance of close communication between the cytopathologist and the clinician'.14 Further, locally negotiated orders are stressed in current clinician training programmes, as practitioners are encouraged to 'Call your cytologist', 'Choose your lab carefully', 'Develop a relationship', and 'Work together'."5 We suspect that it is now, and has been for some years, the high quality of locally negotiated orders in analyzing ambiguous Pap smears that has been most influential in maintaining the Pap smear as an effective screening procedure."6 Right tools are not uniform across contexts, despite goals of global standardization which assume that they are.
Their rightness is contingent and specific to local work arrangements and practices, and must be routinely performed, as our account has shown.
Exploring Alternatives and/or Adjuncts to Pap Smear Screening
Last, replacing or supplementing the Pap smear as a diagnostic technology has also been favoured by some who believe it cannot really be made into the right tool for the job of screening, regardless of the multiple kinds of tinkering strategies delineated here. Some alternative diagnostic procedures which have been promoted and tested include colposcopy, cervicography, cryotherapy, laser therapy, LEEP (Loop Electrosurgical Excision Procedure), ViraPap (a Human Papilloma Virus DNA Detection Kit) and speculoscopy. A key advantage of many of these techniques is that they combine diagnosis with treatment. However, most of these technologies have been found to be much too expensive for mass screening, while diagnostic accuracy remains problematic."7 They also illustrate some of the tensions between clinical and public health contexts, each of which may have differing goals and commitments.
Of potential concern to women's health groups, a 'do-it-yourself Pap smear', called My-Pap, allows a woman to collect cellular material from her vagina and cervix using a douche, rather than a scraping technique, and then to send the sample to a laboratory for analysis. Although this innovation would probably be fast, cheap, simple and private, it is not necessarily accurate. In a clinical trial of 1151 cases, My-Pap and the standard Pap smear showed similar diagnostic effectiveness at the higher end of the abnormality spectrum; however, My-Pap was not as sensitive at lower levels of cellular abnormality."8 It is also unclear whether women using My-Pap would be able to obtain appropriate follow-up services in the event of an abnormal laboratory report, and this was among the reasons why the US FDA did not approve this technology.
In short, alternatives to the clinic-based Pap smear, like the smear itself, are also not fast, cheap and accurate, and hence do not fulfill the criteria for a good screening technology. Further, they are not already organizationally embedded, which makes the Pap smear a consistently welcome diagnostic intervention in both clinical and public health contexts.
Attempting to Rate and Regulate Laboratories
Most of the 'tinkering' strategies discussed here have been pursued, or in fact led, by medical professionals of some sort. In sharp contrast, major scandals about the quality of smears, especially concerning high false negative rates, emerged from consumer concerns and led to women's health movement, consumer movement, and public health department activism. This activism has been aimed at both assuring and expanding federal regulation of diagnostic laboratories. Such regulation is made possible, in the USA, by federal funding for Medicaid and, through grants, for various sites of the provision of family planning services (which tends to be primary gynecological care, including Pap smears). In both such situations, the federal government can make laboratory certification requisite for reimbursement. (Block grants to states can eliminate such requirements.) While activism has assumed varied forms in varied places, one of the earliest alarms raised by consumers was in San Francisco in the mid1970s. There the Coalition for the Medical Rights of Women, an emergent activist group, took up the problem of very high rates of erroneous smear reading at a local laboratory."9 The subgroup in the organization focusing on this work pursued this problem and, realizing from their research that it was generic rather than just an isolated local issue, published a booklet for women's health groups and other health care providers all over the USA and beyond. Titled 'Choosing a Pap Smear Lab', the booklet gave detailed advice on assessing laboratory quality and reliability, and on intervening where smear reading was cavalier.'20
Concern about the adequacy of smear reading was also echoed in the training sessions provided by public health departments for lay health care providers, nurses and physicians. In short, the Pap smear served as a symbol of the 'new' cancer research, and offered a 'cheap' means of importing prevention and early intervention into routine clinical practice. But definition as the 'right' tool did not necessarily mean that the Pap smear became stabilized, once and for all, as a diagnostic technology. Once embedded in practice, the rightness of the Pap smear has had to be continually negotiated, maintained and restored via the multiple tinkering strategies discussed here: gendering and automating the division of labour, juggling costs, focusing on local negotiations for clinical treatment decision-making, attempting to regulate laboratories, and exploring alternative and/or adjunct technologies. Thus, the 'rightness' of a tool may be constantly constructed and reconstructed in diverse ways, at multiple levels of social organization, by actors with a multiplicity of perspectives, operating in complicated social worlds, with diverse interests and agendas, which may all be varyingly addressed over time. Radically, the tool may never be stable or more than 'satisfactory'. As we were preparing the final draft of this paper, an editorial was published titled, 'The Elusive Unequivocal Pap Smear'. 126 How, then, does a tool that is neither particularly 'right' nor 'wrong' endure at the heart of an arena for half a century? First, it must be 'good enough' at least minimally to satisfy all of the social worlds in that arena. Second, it must do important work for the actors and/or worlds with the most power and resources. And third, it must to some degree be standardized and stabilized, however wobbly. That the Pap smear has become the most widely used screening technology reflects, in part, the increasing importance of public health versus local clinical goals. We have discussed the strategies pursued by many different actors working at many different levels of intervention to achieve this degree of 'good enough', and for How is this to be understood vis-d-vis actor-network theory and social worlds/arenas theory? Clearly, in neither account is the scientist or the executive followed. Singleton and Michael followed General Practitioners and the UK Programme, and we followed most everyone and everything. Nor is the technology standardized and hence stabilizing. Nor are the needs and goals of the actors and social worlds involved in accord: rather, they conflicted. Singleton and Michael call this 'ambivalence', viewing their contribution as friendly amendments to actor-network theory:
The alternative metaphor might be that of permanent reform; the world we wish to examine is one of inherent instability and incessant skirmishes. 129 We would agree and go further, including interpretive struggles, outright conflict and power relations. Symmetry is a good first step. We would use it thus to assure that all the actors are present and accounted for. But here too we need to push further, and add implicated actors who, in actornetwork terms, may not be present at the beginning with much agency at all, but who may be the focus of key projects in the arena. They may make their presence felt later, as did consumers, women's health and public health activists in our story.
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In anthropological terms, collective social actors/social worlds are subcultures. Question: 'Ruth Graham, John McDonald, and myself and others found that high school graduates who had no previous experience with microscopy can be made into excellent technicians. Why make college graduates trainees? Won't that decrease the number available?' Answer: 'I, too, have had the experience that individuals from high school very often proved to be the most capable workers in not only cytology but other fields of laboratory medicine as well. I think it is unfortunate that we have no established means of recognizing these people. However, in order to establish reasonably sound criteria which will apply to the greater number of workers, you must start some place to establish minimal requirements, and the ones that I described today were essentially those that were worked out by the special committee of the Inter-Society Cytology Council.' 
